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Abstract: 
 
The first major insurance expansion of the Affordable Care Act – a provision requiring insurers 
to allow dependents to remain on parents’ health insurance until turning 26 – took effect in 
September 2010. We estimate this mandate’s impacts on numerous health-related outcomes 
using a difference-in-differences approach with 23-25 year olds as the treatment group and 27-29 
year olds as the control group. For the full sample, the dependent coverage provision increased 
the probabilities of having insurance, a primary care doctor, and excellent self-assessed health, 
while decreasing unmet medical needs because of cost. However, we find no evidence of 
improvements in preventive care utilization or health behaviors. Subsample analyses reveal 
particularly striking gains for college graduates, including reduced obesity. Finally, we show that 
the mandate’s impacts on 19-22 year olds were generally weaker than those on 23-25 year olds, 
although we observe a reduction in pregnancies for unmarried 19-22 year old women. 
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I. Introduction 
 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of March 2010 aimed to achieve 
nearly universal coverage in the United States through a combination of mandates, subsidies, 
Medicaid expansions, and health insurance exchanges (Gruber, 2011). Although the majority of 
the ACA’s provisions just took effect in 2014, one important component of the law – a 
dependent coverage provision – was implemented on September 23rd, 2010. This provision 
allows dependents to remain on a parent’s private health insurance plan until the start of the first 
plan year after they turn 26 years old. Previously, private insurers often dropped non-student 
dependents at age 19 and student dependents at age 23 (Anderson et al., 2012 and 2014). 
Many states already had some form of dependent coverage mandate before the ACA, but 
the state laws are typically weaker. Most state laws have an age threshold below 26 or require 
additional criteria, such as being a full-time student, living with one’s parents, or not being 
married. Moreover, state laws do not apply to self-funded benefit programs, and more than half 
of private sector workers with employer-provided health insurance are in self-funded plans 
(Monheit et al., 2011). Perhaps because of these limitations, Monheit et al. (2011) and Levine et 
al. (2011) find that state dependent coverage mandates only lead to small increases in dependent 
coverage that are offset by a decline in young adults holding their own policies. In contrast, the 
ACA provision applies to all young adults under age 26 and all private plans. It therefore has the 
potential to dramatically affect young adults across the country, including in states with a pre-
existing dependent coverage provision. 
The ACA dependent coverage expansion provides a unique opportunity to study the 
impacts of a health insurance intervention specific to young adults, the age group with the 
highest uninsured rate (Levine et al., 2011). Prior to the ACA, the uninsured rate was 29% 
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among individuals ages 18-24 and 27% among those 25-34, compared to 19% for 35-44 year 
olds and 14% for 45-64 year olds (DeNavas-Walt et al., 2010). Since any attempt to obtain 
universal coverage necessarily involves large coverage expansions among young adults, it is 
important to understand the effects of insurance on this group. It is unclear the extent to which 
results from other contexts – such as Medicaid, Medicare, or the Massachusetts health care 
reform of 2006 – are applicable. Young adults are generally healthier than the populations 
covered by these programs, and therefore may experience smaller gains from health insurance. 
Alternatively, young adults may be relatively poor and therefore respond strongly to reduced out-
of-pocket costs of medical care.1  
Given the short amount of time since its implementation, researchers are only beginning 
to study the impacts of the ACA dependent coverage provision. Cantor et al. (2012) and 
Sommers and Kronick (2012) find that the mandate increased health insurance coverage for 
young adults across all racial groups and regardless of employment status. Sommers et al. (2013) 
show that the provision increased insurance coverage among young adults, while reducing delays 
in getting care and care foregone because of cost. Akosa Antwi et al. (2013) again find that the 
mandate increased insurance rates, but they also present evidence of labor market consequences 
such as young adults shifting from full-time to part-time jobs. These papers all share a common 
general research design: comparing changes in outcomes among the treated age range 19-25 to 
those of other young adults. Slusky (2013) questions the validity of this approach. He runs 
placebo tests using data from before the mandate and artificial “treatment” dates, finding that the 
same specification estimates significant “effects” more often than could be attributed to chance. 
Most recently, and concurrently with our paper, Akosa Antwi et al. (2014) show that the ACA 
                                                          
1 Aside from age, the ACA dependent coverage mandate is also a unique coverage expansion in that it represents an 
expansion of private rather than public insurance, and that, since it only affects those whose parents have insurance, 
the treated population may be of higher socioeconomic status than that of other interventions. 
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dependent coverage provision increased young adults’ utilization of inpatient care for both 
emergency and non-emergency sources of admissions. They use a narrower age range of 23-25 
for the treatment group and show that the models pass pre-treatment placebo tests. 
We contribute to this growing literature by estimating the effects of the ACA dependent 
coverage provision on a much broader range of health-related outcomes than those previously 
examined. In contrast to prior studies’ focus on insurance status, labor market outcomes, and 
hospitalizations, we investigate 18 outcomes related to health care access, utilization of 
preventive care, risky health behaviors, and self-assessed health. The health care access 
outcomes include having insurance, a primary care doctor, and any foregone care because of cost. 
Our preventive care measures are dummies for recent flu vaccinations, well-patient checkups, 
and pap tests. The health behavior outcomes reflect smoking, drinking, body mass index, 
exercise, and pregnancy. The self-assessed health variables relate to overall, mental, and physical 
health as well as health-related limitations. 
We estimate difference-in-differences models with the treatment group consisting of 
individuals ages 23-25, slightly below the dependent coverage provision’s age cutoff, and the 
control group consisting of those slightly above the cutoff at ages 27-29. Our data come from the 
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). The results from the full sample suggest 
that the ACA dependent coverage provision improved health care access for young adults, had 
little effect on preventive care use or risky health behaviors, and improved self-assessed health 
but only at the high end of the distribution. Specifically, we document increases in the 
probabilities of having health insurance coverage, a primary care doctor, and excellent self-
assessed health, decreases in medical care foregone because of cost and the probability of 
obtaining a flu vaccination, and no clear changes in the other outcomes. We argue for a causal 
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interpretation of these results by performing placebo tests that check for “effects” of artificial 
interventions both in the pre-treatment period (akin to Slusky, 2013) and among those slightly 
too old to be affected by the actual ACA mandate. 
We also evaluate heterogeneity in the effects of the mandate by stratifying the sample by 
prior state dependent coverage mandate status, sex, race, and education. The subsample analyses 
reveal greatest improvements in outcomes for men and college graduates. The benefits for 
college graduates are particularly striking. Not only are the impacts on probabilities of having a 
primary care doctor, reporting excellent health, and foregone medical care especially large, but 
the reduction in flu vaccinations becomes statistically insignificant and new favorable effects 
emerge: increases in the probability of having a well-patient checkup and reporting very good or 
excellent health, as well as a reduction in obesity. 
We close by testing for effects of the dependent coverage provision on younger young 
adults ages 19-22, using 18 and 27 year olds as the control group. The estimated effects on 19-22 
year olds are generally weaker than those on 23-25 year olds, but we do observe one interesting 
new result: a reduction in pregnancies for unmarried women. 
II. Health Insurance and Health-Related Outcomes 
 The most obvious theoretical implication of health insurance is that by lowering the 
effective price of health care, health insurance should increase its utilization (the “access effect”, 
according to Dafny and Gruber, 2005). However, insurance might also lead to substitution across 
different types of services. For instance, if insurance increases preventive services such as doctor 
checkup visits and screenings, this in turn might prevent hospital visits (the “efficiency effect”).  
 While it might be natural to expect that improved access to health care would improve 
health, this is not automatically the case. According to the standard health capital model (e.g. 
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Grossman, 1972), diminishing marginal returns suggest that health care can only improve health 
up to a certain level; any care beyond that is wasteful (“flat of the curve” care). Whether the 
additional consumption of medical care induced by insurance generates substantial gains in 
health therefore depends on the initial level of health capital. Since the uninsured can often 
obtain essential needs by paying directly or receiving charity care, it is not clear that these 
individuals automatically have low baseline levels of health. Moreover, the marginal returns to 
health care differ for different conditions. Risky health behaviors such as smoking, excessive 
drinking, and overeating might be particularly difficult to improve through health care, as they 
require lifestyle changes on the part of the patient. Medical professionals can provide 
accountability, information, strategies, and sometimes drugs that can make behavioral changes 
easier, but these conditions are still harder to treat than, for instance, asthma. 
Another relevant issue when evaluating the impact of health insurance on health is that 
obtaining insurance could induce individuals to take more health risks, since the provision of 
health insurance decreases the financial losses associated with sickness. This concept is known 
as ex ante moral hazard (Ehrlick and Becker, 1972). Theoretically, ex ante moral hazard could 
both increase risky behaviors and reduce investments in preventive care.  
Finally, exogenous provision of health insurance could lead to income effects for 
individuals who used to purchase their own insurance policy but now are able to receive free or 
subsidized coverage, or for the newly-insured if their out-of-pocket medical expenses drop. The 
available causally-interpretable evidence from natural experiments suggests that additional 
income increases health care utilization (Acemoglu et al., 2013), either increases BMI or has no 
effect (Lindahl, 2005; Schmeiser, 2009; Cawley et al., 2010), increases smoking along the 
intensive but not extensive margin (Apouey and Clark, 2014), and increases drinking (Apouey 
7 
 
and Clark, 2014). The income effect may therefore improve health via medical care but worsen 
health via risky behaviors. Accordingly, evidence of income’s causal effect on overall health is 
mixed, with Lindahl (2005) and Frijters et al. (2005) finding that it improves self-assessed health, 
Apouey and Clark (2014) finding that it improves mental health but not overall health, and 
Snyder and Evans (2006) showing that it raises mortality risk among seniors. 
In sum, the effects of insurance on preventive health care utilization, risky health 
behaviors, and overall health status are theoretically ambiguous. Insurance may improve these 
outcomes through direct price effects, worsen them through ex ante moral hazard, or affect them 
in either direction through income effects. The net effects could differ for different outcomes. 
For instance, one might expect direct price effects to dominate for primary care utilization but 
moral hazard to dominate for risky behaviors. Empirical analysis is necessary to resolve this 
ambiguity. 
Quasi-experimental evidence generally confirms the prediction that insurance increases 
health care utilization for U.S. adults. Manning et al. (1987) analyzed the randomized RAND 
Health insurance experiment, finding that lower copayments increased doctor visits. Medicaid 
and Medicare expansions have been shown to increase utilization of primary and hospital care 
(Currie and Gruber, 1996a; Finkelstein et al., 2012; Taubman et al., 2014; Lichtenberg, 2002; 
Card et al., 2008). Other evidence suggests that the Massachusetts universal coverage initiative 
of 2006 increased preventive services while reducing emergency room utilization, avoidable 
hospitalizations, and medical needs unmet because of cost (Miller, 2011; Kolstad and Kowalski, 
2012; Miller, 2012; Van der Wees et al., 2013). More directly relevant to our study population, 
Anderson et al. (2012 and 2014) exploit the sharp drops in coverage on parents’ insurance at 
ages 19 and 23 to show that losing coverage reduced young adults’ emergency room and hospital 
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visits. Finally, as mentioned previously, Akosa Antwi et al. (2014) show that the ACA dependent 
coverage provision increased both emergency and non-emergency admissions to hospitals.  
 The evidence of health insurance’s effect on health is less clear. The RAND experiment 
only found that better insurance coverage improved cholesterol, physical health, or mental health 
for certain subgroups (Brook et al., 1983). Medicaid expansions have been estimated to increase 
self-reported overall, physical, and mental health and reduce mortality, but have no statistically 
detectable effects on laboratory-measured health outcomes (Currie and Gruber, 1996b; 
Finkelstein et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2012; Baicker et al., 2013). Card et al. (2008) find a 
reduction in the mortality rate among recently hospitalized Medicare recipients, but Finkelstein 
and McKnight (2008) find no significant effect of Medicare on the mortality rate of seniors in 
general. Finally, evidence suggests that the Massachusetts reform improved self-assessed overall, 
physical and mental health, while decreasing functional limitations, joint disorders, and mortality 
(Van der Wees et al., 2013; Courtemanche and Zapata, 2014; Sommers et al., 2014).  
 Evidence on the causal effects of health insurance on risky health behaviors is also mixed. 
Brook et al. (1983) find no evidence that insurance affected smoking or body weight in the 
RAND experiment. Dave and Kaestner (2009) report that Medicare decreased physical activity 
while increasing smoking and drinking, but none of these effects were statistically significant. 
Finkelstein et al. (2012) do not find any significant impacts of Medicaid on smoking or BMI. 
Courtemanche and Zapata (2014) find no evidence that the Massachusetts reform affected 
smoking or physical activity, and actually find that it reduced body mass index.  
 In sum, there is little prior evidence on the effects of health insurance on young adults’ 
access to care, preventive care utilization, risky health behaviors, or health. Anderson et al. (2012 
and 2014) and Akosa Antwi et al.’s (2014) studies on young adults focus only on hospital care. 
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Given the theoretical ambiguities and variation in empirical findings discussed above, we cannot 
assume prior results from other contexts such as Medicaid and Medicare generalize. For instance, 
young adults’ relatively high baseline levels of health might lead them to have relatively inelastic 
demand for health care or a low marginal effect of health care on health. On the other hand, 
young adults’ demand for health care could be relatively elastic given their generally low income 
and wealth levels. Moreover, one might expect young adults to be the most susceptible to ex ante 
moral hazard since this is often the life stage in which opportunities to engage in particular risky 
behaviors (e.g. binge drinking) are introduced. 
III. Data 
 
 Our main data source is the BRFSS, a telephone survey conducted by state health 
departments in conjunction with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to collect 
information on health and health behaviors. The survey is conducted monthly through a random 
digit dialing method that selects a representative sample of respondents from the non-
institutionalized population of adults at least 18 years old. The BRFSS provides several 
advantages for our analyses. First, it contains a wide range of appropriate outcome variables. 
Second, it includes demographic characteristics as well as state, month, and year identifiers that 
allow us to construct the treatment variable and jointly control for many different factors. Next, it 
contains a much larger number of observations than other datasets with the necessary variables.  
Finally, the BRFSS includes a number of pre-treatment waves that allow for detailed testing of 
differential trends in the outcomes between treatment and control groups.  
 Our primary analysis sample consists of the 2008-2012 waves, which include the year the 
ACA dependent coverage mandate took effect as well as two years on both sides. We exclude 
the years before 2008 in order to limit our sample to years of relatively poor economic 
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performance. This reduces the possibility of confounding from differential impacts of 
macroeconomic shocks on the health-related outcomes of different age groups. However, 
robustness checks and placebo tests will utilize data as far back as 2001. We do not use any 
waves before 2001 because the BRFSS made major changes to the survey in that year. Many of 
the questions used to construct our outcome variables are either not available in earlier years or 
differ in non-trivial ways.  
 Most of our analyses use ages 23-25 as the treatment group and ages 27-29 as the control 
group. Following most of the prior literature, 26 year olds are excluded because their treatment 
status is ambiguous: they may still be covered by the ACA mandate depending on their birthdate 
and the start date of their parents’ insurance plan year (Akosa Antwi et al., 2013). Several prior 
papers in the literature use 19-25 as the treatment group, but we prefer 23-25 for two reasons.2 
First, prior to the ACA, insurers most commonly dropped non-student dependents from parents’ 
plans at age 19, but most commonly dropped student dependents at age 23. Excluding 19-22 year 
olds therefore results in a “cleaner” treatment group, i.e. a higher proportion of the treatment 
group actually being affected by the treatment. Accordingly, Akosa Antwi et al. (2014) show that 
the ACA dependent coverage provision’s impact on having insurance was more than twice as 
large for 23-25 year olds as for 19-22 year olds. Second, Slusky (2013) shows that the models 
from prior papers with ages 19-25 as the treatment group lead to poor placebo test results for 
insurance and labor market outcomes. He suggests narrowing the age bandwidth as a potential 
solution. Indeed, we will show that wider age ranges lead to problematic placebo test results for 
our outcomes as well, and that our narrower age range performs better.  
                                                          
2 Studies using 19-25 year olds as the treatment group include Cantor et al. (2012), Sommers et al. (2012, 2013), and 
Akosa Antwi et al. (2013). Cantor et al. (2012) use 27-30 year olds as the control group, while Sommers et al. (2012, 
2013) use 26-34 year olds and Akosa Antwi et al. (2013) use 16-18 and 27-29 year olds.   
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 We utilize eighteen different health-related dependent variables. The first three relate to 
health care access: dummy variables reflecting whether the respondent has any health insurance, 
has a primary care physician, and had any medical care needed but not obtained because of cost 
in the previous year.3 The next three outcomes – dummies for having a flu vaccination (shot or 
spray), a well-patient doctor check-up visit (i.e. physical), and a pap test (for women) in the 
previous year – reflect preventive care utilization. Other preventive care variables typically 
studied in the literature (e.g. mammograms and prostate exams) are not relevant for our study 
population of young adults. The next category of variables relates to risky health behaviors: a 
dummy for whether the individual currently smokes, number of alcoholic drinks in the past 30 
days, a dummy for being a risky drinker (more than 30 drinks total or at least one occasion with 
four or more drinks for women, more than 60 drinks total or at least one occasion with five or 
more drinks for men),4 body mass index (BMI=weight in kg/height in m2),5 a dummy for obese 
(BMI≥30), a dummy for whether an unmarried female respondent is pregnant (the only proxy for 
risky sexual activity available in the BRFSS), and a dummy for obtaining any recreational 
exercise in the past 30 days.6 Finally, we include several variables related to self-assessed health 
status: a dummy for whether overall health is very good or excellent, a dummy for whether 
overall health is excellent, and days of the last 30 not in good mental health, not in good physical 
health, and with health-related functional limitations. Although self-assessed health is subjective, 
                                                          
3 The BRFSS does not include more detailed questions on health insurance, such as the source of coverage. 
4 The dummy for risky drinker is created to come as close as the BRFSS data will allow to the National Institute on 
Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism’s definition of at-risk drinking: more than 7 drinks per week total or at least one 
occasion with three or more drinks for women, and more than 14 drinks per week total or at least one occasion with 
four or more drinks for men. See http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/womensfact/womensfact.htm. 
5 Body mass index is based on self-reported height and weight, which are prone to measurement error (Cawley, 
2004). Researchers have repeatedly found that this measurement error does not affect the signs and significance of 
regression estimates with BMI as a dependent variable, though it may slightly attenuate the magnitude of the 
estimates (e.g. Lakdawalla et al., 2002; Courtemanche et al., 2014; Courtemanche et al., forthcoming). 
6 Unfortunately, the more detailed BRFSS questions on physical activity are only available in odd numbered survey 
years and changed dramatically in 2011, so they are not useful for our analyses. 
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research has repeatedly found it to be correlated with objective measures of health such as 
mortality (e.g. Idler and Benyamini, 1997; DeSalvo et al., 2006; Phillips, Der, and Carroll, 2010). 
Self-assessed health also has the advantage of being a global measure of health that captures the 
full range of possible diseases and limitations (Idler and Benyamini, 1997).7  
 We also utilize a wide array of control variables. These include dummy variables for each 
year of age, gender, race/ethnicity, marital status, education, household income category, number 
of children in the household, whether the respondent reports her primary occupation as student, 
and whether the respondent is unemployed. Additionally, we control for monthly state 
unemployment rate, obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. As mentioned previously, we 
are concerned about different impacts of the recession on different age groups, so controlling for 
several variables related to economic conditions at both the individual and aggregate levels could 
potentially be important. We also control for whether the respondent’s state had any dependent 
coverage mandate covering her age*marital status*student status group in the survey year based 
on information from the National Conference of State Legislatures (2010).8  
 Finally, we include a dummy for whether the respondent is part of a “cell phone only” 
component of the sample, added in 2011 (this variable is 0 for all respondents before 2011). The 
fact that individuals who only used cell phones were not explicitly included in the sample until 
2011 raises the question of whether our sample makeup meaningfully changed at about the same 
time the post-treatment period began. To address this issue, we not only control for “cell phone 
only” users but also utilize the BRFSS sampling weights in all analyses. We found that these 
                                                          
7 Moreover, other commonly-used measures of health are not practical in our context. Mortality rates are likely too 
low among young adults to estimate effects of coverage expansions with meaningful precision, while measures of 
avoidable hospitalizations confound insurance’s impact on health with the reduction in effective prices. 
8 Note that not everyone coded as a 1 for state mandate is actually “treated” by such a mandate. Additional qualifiers 
beyond age, student status, and marital status exist in some states, while young adults whose parents’ employers 
self-insure are also not covered by state mandates.  
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weights eliminate any sharp changes in sample demographic characteristics in 2011. 
Additionally, this issue would only bias our regression estimates if the relationship between the 
outcomes of landline and cell phone users is different among 23-25 year olds than among 27-29 
year olds, and in a way that is not captured by the controls. It is not obvious why this would be 
the case. Accordingly, we have verified (results available upon request) that dropping individuals 
who only use cell phones from our sample has very little effect on the coefficient estimates, 
though it does generally increase the standard errors due to the reduced sample size. 
After excluding observations with missing data for any of the control variables, Table 1 
reports the sample sizes for the regressions for each dependent variable, along with the numbers 
of individuals in the treatment and control groups. The sample sizes differ slightly across 
dependent variables for two reasons. First, each health-related variable is missing for a different 
number of respondents. Second, the health-related variables have different “reflection periods;” 
some apply to the present (e.g. current smoker), while others refer to a 30-day period (e.g. 
number of alcoholic drinks in the past 30 days) and others to a one-year period (e.g. well-patient 
doctor visit in the past year). We are concerned that short-run estimates would be misleading for 
variables with a long reflection period.9 We therefore drop respondents who are surveyed during 
this period of ambiguity; e.g. for well-patient doctor visits we drop observations from October 
2010 through September 2011, while for drinks in the past 30 days we drop only October 2010.  
Table 2 lists the control variables and compares the pre-treatment (January 2008 through 
September 2010) summary statistics of the treatment and control groups. Individuals in the 
treatment group are less likely to be married, have a college degree, earn a high income, and 
have children in the household, and they are more likely to be students or employed.  
                                                          
9 For example, suppose a respondent is surveyed in November 2010, the second month of the post-implementation 
period. The respondent would be classified as post-treatment, but her answer about well-patient doctor visits in the 
past year would reflect only two months of the post-treatment period and ten months of the pre-treatment period. 
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Table 3 reports the pre- and post-treatment sample means of the outcome variables for the 
treatment and control groups, and calculates the simple difference-in-difference of means. Prior 
to the ACA dependent coverage provision, the uninsured rate was higher for young adults in the 
treatment group than those in the control group. The treatment group had lower rates of health 
care utilization and health care access than the control group; slightly higher drinking and 
unmarried pregnancy rates but healthier levels of risky drinking, BMI, obesity, and exercise; and 
broadly similar levels of smoking and self-assessed health. Comparing changes in the post- and 
pre-treatment means for the treatment and control groups, the difference-in-differences are 
positive and significant for any insurance, primary care doctor, and excellent health, negative and 
significant for care needed but not obtained because of cost, and insignificant for the other 
outcomes – including all those in the preventive care and health behavior categories. 
Simple difference-in-differences estimates account for fixed differences in unobservable 
characteristics between the treatment and control group, but are still susceptible to bias from 
time-varying observables and unobservables. Figures 1-3 show that at a first glance the pre-ACA 
trends for the treatment and control groups appear generally similar for most outcomes, 
providing preliminary evidence that changes over time in observables and unobservables may 
not be substantially different for 23-25 year olds and 27-29 year olds. We next turn to regression 
analyses that adjust for changes in observables. Later, we will also conduct more formal tests of 
the assumption of common trends in unobservables. 
IV. Average Effects of the ACA Dependent Coverage Mandate 
 
 We estimate the effects of the ACA dependent coverage provision on the 18 health-
related outcomes using difference-in-differences regressions. We prefer reduced-form models to 
instrumental variables models using the mandate as an instrument for having insurance coverage 
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because there are several other mechanisms through which the mandate could affect health-
related outcomes besides the extensive margin of health insurance coverage. Other possible 
mechanisms include the intensive margin of coverage (switching from high deductible 
catastrophic coverage to more comprehensive coverage), income effects, and peer effects. 
Our baseline regression is of the form 
𝑌𝑖𝑔𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1�𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑔 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡� +  𝛽2𝑿𝒊𝒈𝒔𝒕′ + 𝛼𝑔 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑔𝑠𝑡                   (1) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑔𝑠𝑡  is the health-related outcome for individual i of age g living in state s in time t, 
expressed in a month/year combination.10 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑔 is a dummy variable for whether age g is in the 
treated age range 23-25 as opposed to the control age range 27-29. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡  indicates whether 
period t is after the implementation of the provision (October 2010 or later). 11  𝛽1  is the 
difference-in-differences coefficient and it captures the difference between the effect of the 
mandate on the treatment group relative to the control group. 𝑿𝒊𝒈𝒔𝒕′  is a vector of the 
aforementioned control variables for sex, race, marital status, education, income, children, cell 
phone survey, student status, individual and state unemployment, and state dependent coverage 
mandate. We also include fixed effects for each year of age, month/year of time (e.g. January of 
2008), and state, denoted by 𝛼𝑔, 𝜑𝑡 , and 𝜎𝑠 , respectively. 𝜀𝑖𝑔𝑠𝑡  is the error term.
12 We report 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the level of treatment: the age/time 
interaction.13  
                                                          
10 Even though most of our outcomes are binary or non-negative count, we estimate linear models because they 
typically give reliable estimates of average effects (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). In unreported regressions (available 
upon request), we verify that the average treatment effects are very similar using probit regressions for the binary 
outcomes and negative binomial regressions for the count outcomes.  
11 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑔 and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 are not separately included because the age and time fixed effects subsume 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑔 and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 . 
12 In unreported regressions (available upon request) we have verified the results remain virtually identical if we 
replace the state fixed effects with fixed effects for each state-by-year combination.  
13 Standard errors are generally similar if we cluster by only age. We prefer, however, to cluster by age*time in our 
reported estimates because clustering by only age results in too few clusters (11 in the full sample, 6 in the restricted 
sample) to be reliable (Angrist and Pischke, Chapter 8).  
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The key identifying assumption in a difference-in-differences model is common 
counterfactual trends between the treatment and control groups; i.e. in the absence of the 
intervention the treatment and control groups would have experienced the same changes in 
outcomes. Slusky (2013) argues that this assumption is problematic when studying the impact of 
the ACA dependent coverage provision on labor market-related outcomes (e.g. sources of health 
insurance coverage, employment status, and work hours) since cyclical fluctuations in the 
economy have different effects on different age groups. In our view, the difference-in-differences 
identifying assumption seems somewhat less troublesome for health outcomes than labor market 
outcomes, since health outcomes are less directly tied to cyclical fluctuations in the economy.14 
Moreover, using narrow age bandwidths of 23-25 and 27-29 should substantially mitigate any 
differential shocks that may exist. 
 We also estimate several variations of (1) as robustness checks. First, we run regressions 
including only the demographic controls (the sex, age, race, children, and marital status dummies) 
and fixed effects, excluding the economic controls since they may be endogenous and the 
resulting bias could potentially spill over into the coefficient estimate of interest. Next, in order 
to verify that the results are not driven by our chosen length of the pre-treatment period, we 
consider two alternatives: starting the sample in 2005 and 2001. Finally, we run regressions 
dropping March 2010 through December 2010, as these months are somewhat ambiguous with 
respect to their treatment status. We drop March-September because the ACA was passed in 
March, so some insurance plans may have complied preemptively prior to the dependent 
coverage provision’s official implementation in September. We drop October-December because, 
                                                          
14 Although research shows that recessions are associated with improvements in health and health behaviors (e.g. 
Ruhm, 2000, 2002, and 2005), we are unaware of any evidence that economic cycles differentially impact different 
age groups of young adults. Moreover, recent research suggests that the countercyclical nature of health observed in 
prior recessions was not present during our sample period (Ruhm, 2013 and Tekin et al., 2013). 
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even though the mandate was implemented in September, insurers did not have to comply until 
the start of the next plan year, which is often January.15  
Table 4 presents the results for the baseline model and robustness checks. In addition to 
reporting estimated treatment effects and standard errors, for the baseline regressions we also 
report (in brackets) the treatment effect expressed in standard deviations of the dependent 
variable to provide some comparability of effect sizes across the different outcomes.  
The results suggest sizeable improvements in health care access. We estimate that the 
ACA dependent coverage provision statistically significantly increased the insurance coverage 
rate of 23-25 year olds by 5.6-6.7 percentage points. This is somewhat larger than the around 3-5 
percentage point increase estimated by previous studies that use the broader treated age range of 
19-25 (Cantor et al., 2012; Sommers and Kronick, 2012; Akosa Antwi et al., 2013; Sommers et 
al., 2013).16 Additionally, the mandate decreased the probability of having any care needed but 
foregone because of cost by 2.2-2.8 percentage points and increased the probability of having a 
primary care doctor by 1.8-3.9 percentage points.  
However, we do not find any evidence of increased preventive care utilization. We 
estimate a statistically significant 2.1-2.7 percentage point decrease in the probability of having a 
flu vaccination, which may be due to young adults with insurance coverage being less afraid of 
facing financial problems caused by further health treatments – potentially hospitalizations – if 
they get the flu. This is consistent with ex ante moral hazard. We find no statistically significant 
effect of the mandate on well-patient checkups or pap tests for women. 
                                                          
15 Akosa Antwi et al. (2013) include two treatment variables to separately model the effects of the mandate during 
the implementation period and after full implementation. We have considered this specification in unreported 
regressions and the estimated post-implementation effects remain very similar. 
16  This discrepancy is consistent with Akosa Antwi et al.’s (2014) finding that the mandate’s impact on the 
probability of having any coverage was around twice as large for 23-25 year olds than 19-22 year olds (4 compared 
to 2 percentage points). Alternatively, estimates using the treated age range 19-25 could be biased downward given 
the problems documented in our placebo tests and those of Slusky (2013). 
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We also find no clear evidence that the dependent coverage provision influenced risky 
health behaviors. Across 7 dependent variables with 5 specifications each, we do not observe a 
single statistically significant estimate. This is somewhat remarkable, since out of 35 estimates 
we would expect at least one to be significant simply by chance. With that said, in every 
specification the mandate is associated with increases in drinks per month and risky drinking and 
decreases in BMI and obesity, even though the estimates are never statistically significant. It is 
theoretically conceivable that insurance coverage could increase drinking but reduce weight, as 
health care access may be more helpful for losing weight than reducing drinking. Gains in 
information and accountability may both be greater for weight control than drinking: dieting 
strategies can be complicated and benefit greatly from professional advice, and accountability is 
greater for weight since patients are weighed at each visit. The direct price effect could therefore 
dominate for BMI, while the ex ante moral hazard effect could dominate for drinking. Income 
effects may play a role as well, especially for alcohol consumption given the aforementioned 
evidence of a positive causal effect of income on drinking (Apouey and Clark, 2014).  
Turning to the self-assessed health outcomes, the mandate increased the probability of 
young adults reporting excellent overall health by 2.1-2.4 percentage points, but the effect on 
reporting very good or excellent health was smaller and only statistically significant in two 
regressions. Together, these results suggest that most of the mandate’s effect on health occurs by 
transitioning young adults from very good to excellent health, which is perhaps not surprising 
given the high baseline health level of this age group. Possibly for this reason, we do not find any 
evidence of effects on the variables representing more severe health problems: days not in good 
mental health, not in good physical health, and with health-related functional limitations. 
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 Finally, we provide a brief discussion of the relative magnitudes of the effects on 
different outcomes by comparing the treatment effects expressed in standard deviations of the 
dependent variables. Not surprisingly, the largest effect of 0.132 standard deviations is on the 
probability of having any health insurance coverage. The next largest effects are on personal 
doctor visits (0.064 standard deviations), flu vaccinations (-0.062 standard deviations), care 
prevented because of cost (-0.058 standard deviations), and excellent health (0.051 standard 
deviations). Although not significant, the mandate’s effect on drinks per month is the next largest 
(0.037 standard deviations). The other statistically insignificant effects are generally quite small, 
ranging from 0.005 to 0.025 standard deviations. 
V. Placebo Tests  
 We next provide a series of placebo tests to evaluate whether the previous results can 
credibly be interpreted as causal effects of the ACA dependent coverage provision. We first 
follow Slusky’s (2013) approach and estimate variants of equation (1) that test for “effects” of 
artificially-timed “treatments” during pre-treatment years. We estimate models for five different 
five-year windows of pre-treatment data (to match the five years used in our main 2008-2012 
analyses): 2005-2009, 2004-2008, 2003-2007, 2002-2006, and 2001-2005. Since the first month 
after the implementation of the actual dependent coverage mandate was the 34th month (October 
2010) of our 2008-2012 sample, in each placebo test sample we date the implementation of the 
artificial intervention to the 34th month (e.g. October 2007 for the 2005-2009 sample). We 
estimate (1) for each of the 18 dependent variables in each of the five placebo test samples. 
 Placebo tests using pre-treatment data will detect differential underlying trends between 
treatment and control groups, but they are not able to detect potential confounding from unique 
shocks to treatment and control groups that do not emerge until the time of treatment. For 
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instance, if different age groups of young adults followed similar trends in health until the Great 
Recession, at which point some groups’ health changed relative to others, the model would pass 
pre-treatment placebo tests but still produce invalid estimated effects of the mandate. We 
therefore consider an additional placebo test that utilizes the actual date of the mandate’s 
implementation. Specifically, we estimate model (1) with 2008-2012 data, but define artificial 
treatment and control groups as being the youngest age ranges possible that do not include the 
actual treated ages. Whereas our main sample classifies those 23-25 as the treatment group and 
27-29 as the control group, the sample for this placebo test therefore uses those 27-29 as the 
treatment group and 31-33 as the control group. We drop age 30 to parallel our dropping of age 
26 in the main sample. This test evaluates whether different groups of young adults experienced 
different shocks at around the time of the ACA.  
 Table 5 reports the coefficient estimates of interest from these placebo tests. We run six 
tests for each of the 18 dependent variables, though in three cases tests are not possible because 
the dependent variable is not available in some of the early years. This leaves a total of 105 
regressions. Given the large number of estimates, we would expect some significant results even 
for valid models. Specifically, approximately 1 estimate should be significant at the 1% level, 4-
5 at the 5% level, and 9-10 at the 10% level. We obtain numbers in the vicinity of these. 4 
estimated “treatment effects” (3.8%) are significant at the 1% level, 7 (6.7%) at the 5% level, and 
10 (9.5%) at the 10% level. Moreover, we do not observe any clear evidence of sustained 
differential pre-treatment trends between the treatment and control groups, as there are no 
dependent variables for which the placebo tests consistently produce either significant positive or 
significant negative coefficient estimates. 
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Also, it is interesting to note that most of the placebo test failures are concentrated among 
two outcomes: primary care doctor (2 out of 6) and smoker (3 out of 6).  Indeed, excluding these 
variables the placebo tests only reject the null hypothesis 0.95% of the time at the 1% level, 2.9% 
at the 5% level, and 4.8% at the 10% level. Therefore, a more nuanced interpretation of our 
placebo test results would be that the model performs very well for most outcomes but somewhat 
problematically for two. We therefore next conduct additional robustness checks of the main 
specification for the two problematic outcomes. Specifically, we narrow the age bandwidth 
further, thereby presumably reducing the differences in unobservable characteristics between the 
treatment and control groups. The first additional robustness check uses only ages 24-25 as the 
treatment group and ages 27-28 as the control group, while the second check uses just ages 25 
and 27. It should be noted that we would not necessarily expect the robustness check results to 
remain identical to those from the main specification even if both models are valid. The causal 
effects of the dependent coverage provision may be genuinely different for 23, 24, and 25 year 
olds. Indeed, this is the reason we do not perform similar robustness checks for all the outcomes. 
Table 6 reports the results from these additional robustness checks for primary care doctor and 
smoker. The conclusions reached are the same as those from the main specification.   
Finally, in the interest of contributing to the broader debate in the literature about the 
appropriateness of different age bandwidths when using difference-in-differences models to 
estimate the effects of the ACA dependent coverage provision, we also run the same set of 
placebo tests for numerous wider age ranges than our preferred specification: 1) treatment group 
22-25 and control group 27-30, 2) treatment group 21-25 and control group 27-31, 3) treatment 
group 20-25 and control group 27-32, 4) treatment group 19-25 and control group 27-33, and 5) 
treatment group 19-25 and control group 18 plus 27-29. Case 4 is the most similar specification 
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to the majority of studies in the literature (Cantor et al., 2012; Sommers and Kronick, 2012; 
Sommers et al., 2013), while case 5 is most similar to Akosa Antwi et al. (2013). For the placebo 
tests with individuals too old to be affected by the mandate, we again use the closest parallel 
construction that excludes treated ages. For instance, when the treatment group is 19-25 and the 
control group is 27-33, the artificial treatment and control groups are ages 27-33 and 35-41, 
respectively. Table 7 summarizes the results from these placebo tests with wider age bandwidths; 
the full results are available upon request. Our preferred treatment and control groups – in bold – 
perform noticeably better than those using wider age ranges. The number of null hypothesis 
rejections at the 10% level is the lowest, while the number of outcomes with no placebo test 
failures and the number with only one failure are the highest. 
VI. Heterogeneity 
 Having established our baseline results and assessed the validity of our model, we next 
turn to an examination of heterogeneity in the treatment effects. Tables 8 and 9 report results for 
subsamples defined based on whether the respondent’s state had any pre-ACA dependent 
coverage provision as well as the respondent’s sex, race, and education. The mandate should 
affect young adults in all states regardless of the given limitations of the state laws discussed in 
Section I, but we might expect stronger effects in states without any pre-ACA mandates. 
However, this may not necessarily be the case: Monheit et al. (2011) and Levine et al. (2011) 
find minimal effects of state dependent coverage provisions on uninsured rates, while Akosa 
Antwi et al. (2013) did not find meaningfully different effects of the ACA dependent coverage 
provision on coverage rates by pre-ACA state law status. The ACA mandate may have 
differential impacts by sex or race if demographic groups differ in their pre-ACA insurance 
coverage rates or propensity to alter health care utilization and health behaviors in responses to 
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obtaining coverage. The nature of heterogeneity by education is unclear. Young adults of high 
socioeconomic status may be more likely to both have their own employer-provided health 
insurance and to have parents with employer-provided coverage. Responses to obtaining 
coverage may also differ by education, as Grossman (1972) posits that more educated individuals 
are more efficient producers of health given the same amount of inputs. 
 The first two columns of Table 8 show the results stratified by pre-ACA state law status. 
Sizeable coverage expansions are evident in both subsamples, though the increase is somewhat 
larger for individuals in states without any prior mandate (8.9 percentage points compared to 5.1). 
The patterns for the other outcomes are mixed, with the effect on overall self-assessed health 
being larger in states with no pre-ACA dependent coverage provision but the impacts on having 
a primary care doctor, care foregone because of cost, and flu shots being smaller in these states. 
It is not necessarily contradictory that the effects on some outcomes are stronger in the opposite 
subsample of the one with the larger increase in probability of having health insurance. 
Responses to obtaining insurance coverage could differ across subsamples, while changes in the 
intensive margin of coverage (source and generosity of coverage) could also influence outcomes 
and we are unable to measure such changes in our data.  
 The last two columns of Table 8 report the results separately for women and men. The 
favorable effects on the probabilities of having health insurance coverage, a primary care doctor, 
foregone care because of cost, and excellent overall health are all stronger for men, while the 
adverse effect on flu vaccinations is stronger for women. Interestingly, women do not experience 
a statistically significant improvement in any outcomes besides health insurance coverage. 
Instead, they reduce flu vaccinations and slightly increase smoking and days of health-related 
limitations. In contrast, men do not experience a single statistically significant adverse effect (the 
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reduction in flu vaccinations is insignificant). These patterns could potentially be explained by 
greater ex ante moral hazard among women or greater price sensitivity in preventive health care 
utilization among men, although future research would be necessary to test these hypotheses 
more directly. 
 Turning to Table 9, the first two columns split the sample into non-Hispanic whites and 
those of another race/ethnicity. 17 The impacts of the ACA dependent coverage mandate on 
insurance coverage are virtually identical for the two groups, and many of the other results are 
also similar. However, an important difference is that significant improvements in care foregone 
because of cost and excellent self-reported health are only observed for whites. In fact, the only 
significant effect for non-whites in the self-assessed health category is a small and marginally 
significant worsening of physical health. On the other hand, the increase in probability of having 
a primary care doctor is almost twice as large for non-whites as whites. One explanation that 
would fit with this pattern of results is if non-white young adults were more likely to utilize 
safety net care prior to obtaining insurance coverage; in this case, they would not have a primary 
care doctor but still have their critical health care needs met. Again, however, directly testing this 
hypothesis is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 Finally, the last two columns of Table 9 report the results stratifying by college degree 
attainment.18 The increase in the probability of having any coverage is slightly larger for those 
without a college degree, but the rest of the results are substantially more favorable for college 
graduates. College graduates experience substantially larger improvements in the probabilities of 
having a primary care doctor, care foregone because of cost, and excellent overall self-assessed 
                                                          
17 We attempted further stratification within the non-white category but the estimates became too imprecise to be 
useful. 
18 Again, further stratification led to estimates that were too imprecise to be useful. Note that we do not include a 
separate category for current students because our sample only includes those 23 and older, so the proportion of our 
respondents reporting “student” as their primary occupation is low.   
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health than those estimated earlier for the full sample, while the reduction in flu shots becomes 
statistically insignificant. Moreover, new favorable statistically significant effects emerge: 
increases in well-patient checkups and very good or excellent self-assessed health as well as a 
decrease in obesity. In contrast, no statistically significant improvements are observed for those 
without a college degree aside from increases in health insurance and having a primary care 
doctor. In short, both groups experience large gains in insurance coverage but obtaining coverage 
appears to only lead to substantial new investments in health for highly educated individuals. 
This is consistent with the prediction of Grossman (1972) that education enables individuals to 
become more efficient producers of health. It could also reflect underlying differences in time 
preferences and demand for health. Regardless of the reason, these results are important: while 
the ACA dependent coverage expansion does lead to many favorable outcomes, these 
improvements are concentrated among high socioeconomic status (SES) groups. The mandate 
therefore appears to increase SES-based disparities in health.    
 In unreported regressions, we conducted the same set of placebo tests as Table 5 for each 
subsample (results available upon request). We then ran the additional robustness checks with 
narrower age bandwidths for any outcome in any subsample with multiple placebo test failures. 
The results from these robustness checks are reported in Appendix Tables A2 and A3. In most 
cases, the results are not consequentially different from those in Tables 8 and 9. 
VII. Effects on Younger Young Adults 
 Our preceding analyses focused only on the effects of the ACA dependent coverage 
mandate on 23-25 year olds. In this section, we provide a preliminary attempt to evaluate the 
effects on 19-22 year olds. As discussed previously, we expect the impacts on 19-22 year olds to 
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be weaker than those on 23-25 year olds, as these younger young adults were more likely to be 
eligible for their parents’ insurance prior to the ACA.   
Through trial and error, we found that using 19-22 year olds as the treatment group and 
18 plus 27 year olds as the control group leads to placebo tests with approximately the 
appropriate number of failures (results available upon request). Using these classifications, we 
re-estimate the baseline specification from equation (1) and report the results in Table 10, 
alongside the earlier results for 23-25 year olds for comparison purposes. The estimated effect of 
the ACA provision on insurance coverage is smaller for 19-22 year olds than for 23-25 year olds, 
and we no longer observe increases in the probabilities of having a primary care doctor and 
excellent self-assessed health. However, the impact on care foregone because of cost remains 
about the same, the reduction in body mass index is larger for 19-22 year olds and becomes 
statistically significant, and we now observe a significant reduction in pregnancies – perhaps due 
to easier access to birth control or abortions. On the other hand, the reduction in flu vaccinations 
is even larger for 19-22 year olds, and we observe an additional negative effect on preventive 
care utilization: a statistically significant reduction in well-patient checkups.  
Four of the outcomes – health insurance, pap test in past year, body mass index, and 
obese – had multiple placebo test failures for this younger sample. We therefore ran additional 
robustness checks with narrower age bandwidths for these outcomes. The first robustness check 
uses only 19-20 year olds as the treatment group and only 18 year olds as the control group, 
while the second compares only 18 and 19 year olds. The results are reported in Appendix Table 
A4. The most noteworthy difference is that the reduction in BMI is no longer significant in the 
two robustness checks. In sum, we view the gains from the ACA dependent coverage mandate to 
be generally weaker for 19-22 year olds than 23-25 year olds: the insurance expansion is smaller 
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and the gains in primary care doctor and excellent health disappear. The finding that pregnancies 
dropped among unmarried 19-22 year old women but not 23-25 year olds, however, stands as a 
noteworthy exception.  
VIII. Discussion 
The first major insurance expansion under the ACA – a provision requiring insurers to 
allow young adults to remain on their parents’ health insurance until turning 26 – was 
implemented in September 2010. This paper uses data from the BRFSS to examine the effects of 
this mandate on various outcomes related to health care access, preventive care utilization, risky 
health behaviors, and self-assessed health. We implement a difference-in-differences model with 
individuals slightly below the mandate’s age cutoff (ages 23-25) as the treatment group and those 
slightly above the cutoff (ages 27-29) as the control group. We first estimate average effects for 
the entire sample. The results suggest that the ACA dependent coverage provision increased 
health care access but not utilization of preventive care, had no clear effects on risky health 
behaviors, and improved health but only at the high end of the distribution. Specifically, the 
mandate increased the probabilities of having health insurance, a primary care doctor, and 
excellent self-assessed health, decreased the probabilities of having medical care foregone 
because of cost and a flu vaccination, and did not clearly impact the other outcomes. We then 
validate our model through a series of placebo tests and also show that our classifications of 
treatment and control groups perform better in these tests that the wider age bandwidths common 
in the literature. Next, we conduct subsample analyses by pre-ACA state dependent coverage 
mandate status, sex, race, and education. We find particularly striking improvements in outcomes 
for college graduates. In addition to stronger effects on health care access and self-assessed 
excellent health than those for the full sample, college graduates also experienced improvements 
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in well-patient checkups, obesity, and very good/excellent health. Finally, we provide a 
preliminary attempt to estimate the mandate’s impacts on 19-22 year olds, finding that they were 
generally weaker than the effects on 23-25 year olds, with the exception of the emergence of a 
reduction in pregnancies for unmarried women.  
The ACA dependent coverage mandate provides a unique opportunity to study a health 
insurance intervention specific to young adults as opposed to seniors (Medicare), the poor 
(Medicaid), or the uninsured population at large (the Massachusetts reform). In general, our 
results suggest that health insurance affects health-related outcomes of young adults more 
modestly than prior studies have observed for these other populations. First, we find no evidence 
of increased preventive care utilization for the full sample, in contrast to prior results from both 
Medicaid (Finkelstein et al., 2012) and the Massachusetts reform (Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012). 
Second, we only find evidence of an improvement in overall self-assessed health at the top of the 
distribution (excellent health), and we do not observe any gains in self-assessed physical or 
mental health or functional limitations. Clearer effects on all these outcomes have been observed 
for both Medicaid (Finkelstein et al., 2012) and the Massachusetts reform (Van der Wees et al., 
2013; Courtemanche and Zapata, 2014). Our null result for mental health is particularly 
interesting since health insurance can improve mental health without even affecting health care 
utilization, simply by reducing stress about financial uncertainty (Finkelstein et al., 2012). 
Perhaps this stress reduction is relatively small for young adults.  
Alternatively, a more optimistic interpretation of our results is that we do observe some 
improvements in important outcomes, particularly care foregone because of cost and excellent 
self-assessed health, with gains in additional outcomes also being evident for college graduates. 
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One might have initially worried that a coverage expansion for young adults would not lead to 
any health improvements given the generally good baseline health of this age group. 
One important contribution of our paper is that we provide among the most thorough 
empirical investigations of ex ante moral hazard available in the literature. Prior studies on ex 
ante moral hazard are rare, and those that exist focus on risky behaviors (e.g. Dave and Kaestner, 
2009; Courtemanche and Zapata, 2014). We study not only several risky behaviors, but also 
investments in preventive care. Indeed, the only clear evidence we find consistent with ex ante 
moral hazard is for one of the preventive care outcomes: flu vaccinations. A natural question is 
why ex ante moral hazard might be more relevant for flu vaccinations than physicals or risky 
behaviors such as smoking, drinking, and having a sedentary lifestyle. One possible explanation 
is that the downside risks of not having a flu shot – medical expenses associated with the flu – 
occur in the same year. In contrast, expenditures to treat diseases associated with smoking, 
excessive drinking, obesity, and not having a physical typically occur years down the road. 
Perhaps uninsured young adults assume that they will be insured by time these downside risks 
are realized, in which case ex ante moral hazard would not apply.  
Another interesting result is that, since the improvement in health is concentrated among 
college graduates, the ACA dependent coverage provision appears to increase SES-based 
disparities in health. This is contrary to the usual impacts of public policies to expand health 
insurance. Medicaid has been shown to improve at least some health outcomes (Currie and 
Gruber 1996a and 1996b; Finkelstein et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2012), implying that the 
program reduces income-based disparities in health. The Massachusetts reform also appears to 
have reduced income-based disparities, as Courtemanche and Zapata (2014) found the largest 
gains in self-assessed health among low-income individuals. 
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Several caveats to our analyses provide directions for future research. First, we focus on 
estimating the ACA dependent coverage provision’s effects on 23-25 year olds, providing only a 
brief attempt to also evaluate 19-22 year olds because of the greater difficulty in finding a 
suitable control group and the weaker ex ante expectations of significant effects. Further 
understanding whether benefits accrue to young adults besides 23-25 year olds is obviously 
important in order to fully evaluate the policy. Next, further research is necessary to understand 
the mechanisms through which the mandate improves health. Our results – the reduction in care 
foregone because of cost, the lack of effects on preventive care or health behaviors, and the 
improvement in excellent overall health but not the other self-assessed health variables – are all 
consistent with increased access to health care leading to better treatment for mild chronic 
conditions (e.g. allergies, acid reflux, minor depression), but our data do not allow a direct test of 
this hypothesis. Finally, and critically, our results should not be interpreted as providing a full 
accounting of the benefits of expanding insurance coverage among young adults. The primary 
purpose of insurance is to protect individuals from financial risk, and gains along this dimension 
may be especially substantial for young adults given their relatively low income and wealth 
levels. Moreover, expanding coverage among young adults is an important component of the 
overall strategy behind the ACA since it is necessary to offset the additional costs of insuring 
older and sicker individuals under community rating. In other words, the costs and benefits of the 
different components of the ACA need to be evaluated together, as the different pieces of the 
reform are designed to work synergistically. 
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Figure 1 -- Trends in Access to Care and Preventive Care Variables by Age Group  
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Figure 2 -- Trends in Health Behavior Variables by Age Group 
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Figure 3 -- Trends in Self-Assessed Health Variables by Age Group 
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Table 1 – Sample Sizes for Different Outcomes 
Outcome Variable Total Treatment (23-25) 
Control    
(27-29) 
Health care access    
     Any health insurance coverage 85,597 35,294 50,303 
     Any primary care doctor 80,003 32,943 47,060 
     Cost prevented care in past year 66,684 27,251 39,433 
Preventive care utilization    
     Flu vaccination in past year 64,873 26,422 38,451 
     Well-patient checkup in past year 66,739 27,276 39,463 
     Pap test in past year (women only) 26,919+ 10,799 16,120 
Risky health behaviors    
     Currently smokes cigarettes 85,147 35,120 50,027 
     Alcoholic drinks in past 30 days 81,325 33,436 47,889 
     Risky drinker in past 30 days 80,682 33,144 47,538 
     Body mass index 81,284 33,632 47,652 
     Obese 81,284 33,632 47,652 
     Any exercise in past 30 days 83,511 34,461 49,050 
     Pregnancy (unmarried women only) 26,832 13,133 13,699 
Self-assessed health    
     Overall health very good or excellent 85,541 35,321 50,220 
     Overall health excellent 85,541 35,321 50,220 
     Days of last 30 not in good mental health 83,937 34,708 49,229 
     Days of last 30 not in good physical health 83,988 34,707 49,281 
     Days of last 30 with health-related limitations 84,329 34,867 49,462 
+The pap test variable is only available in even-numbered years, reducing the sample size for that outcome. 
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Table 2 – Pre-Treatment Means and Standard Deviations for Control Variables 
Control Variable Treatment (Ages 23-25) Control (Ages 27-29) 
Age dummies (age=23 is omitted)   
     Age=24 0.349 (0.477)  
     Age=25 0.321 (0.467)  
     Age=27  0.308 (0.461) 
     Age=28  0.341 (0.474) 
     Age=29  0.352 (0.477) 
Female 0.504 (0.500) 0.505 (0.500) 
Race/ethnicity dummies (non-Hispanic white is omitted) 
     Non-Hispanic black 0.114 (0.318) 0.119 (0.323) 
     Hispanic 0.222 (0.415) 0.213 (0.410) 
     Other than black, Hispanic, or white 0.093 (0.290) 0.076 (0.266) 
Currently married 0.292 (0.455) 0.556 (0.497) 
Education dummies (less than high school degree is omitted) 
     High school degree but no further 0.283 (0.450) 0.253 (0.435) 
     Some college but no four-year degree 0.297 (0.457) 0.277 (0.448) 
     College graduate 0.307 (0.461) 0.358 (0.479) 
Household income dummies (less than $10,000 is omitted) 
     Between $10,000 and $15,000 0.069 (0.253) 0.052 (0.223) 
     Between $15,000 and $20,000 0.102 (0.303) 0.081 (0.273) 
     Between $20,000 and $25,000 0.116 (0.320) 0.098 (0.297) 
     Between $25,000 and $35,000 0.139 (0.346) 0.126 (0.332) 
     Between $35,000 and $50,000 0.163 (0.369) 0.160 (0.367) 
     Between $50,000 and $75,000 0.140 (0.347) 0.185 (0.388) 
     $75,000 and over 0.186 (0.389) 0.236 (0.425) 
Number of children in household dummies (0 is omitted) 
     One child 0.228 (0.420) 0.233 (0.423) 
     Two children 0.158 (0.365) 0.234 (0.424) 
     Three children 0.057 (0.232) 0.109 (0.312) 
     Four children 0.017 (0.130) 0.036 (0.187) 
     Five or more children 0.008 (0.090) 0.016 (0.126) 
Cell phone only  0.645 (0.479)+ 0.604 (0.489)+ 
Student 0.113 (0.317) 0.055 (0.227) 
Unemployed 0.128 (0.334) 0.108 (0.310) 
State unemployment rate 7.922 (2.492) 8.134 (2.470) 
Pre-ACA state mandate 0.271 (0.444) 0.045 (0.207) 
Notes: BRFSS sampling weights are used. Means are reported, with standard deviations in parentheses. + indicates 
the summary statistics are from 2011-2012, since the variable is 0 for all respondents in all prior years.
41 
 
Table 3 – Means and Standard Deviations for Outcome Variables 
 Pre-Treatment Period Post-Treatment Period Difference-in-
Difference 
Outcome Variable Treatment (Ages 23-25) 
Control (Ages 27-
29) 
Treatment (Ages 
23-25) 
Control (Ages 27-
29) 
Health care access      
     Any health insurance coverage 0.677 (0.468) 0.748 (0.434) 0.703 (0.457) 0.700 (0.458) 0.074 (0.013)*** 
     Any primary care doctor 0.561 (0.496) 0.639 (0.480) 0.526 (0.499) 0.564 (0.496) 0.039 (0.013)*** 
     Cost prevented care in past year 0.248 (0.432) 0.220 (0.414) 0.249 (0.432) 0.242 (0.428) -0.020 (0.011)* 
Preventive care utilization      
     Flu vaccination in past year 0.229 (0.420) 0.249 (0.432) 0.235 (0.424) 0.261 (0.439) -0.007 (0.012) 
     Well-patient checkup in past year 0.520 (0.500) 0.543 (0.498) 0.513 (0.500) 0.527 (0.499) 0.009 (0.014) 
     Pap test in past year 0.693 (0.461) 0.724 (0.447) 0.623 (0.485) 0.656 (0.475) -0.002 (0.021) 
Risky health behaviors      
     Currently smokes cigarettes 0.250 (0.433) 0.250 (0.433) 0.261 (0.439) 0.262 (0.440) -0.001 (0.011) 
     Alcoholic drinks in past 30 days 17.478 (45.580) 14.394 (36.540) 19.937 (44.679) 16.065 (36.643) 0.788 (1.301) 
     Risky drinker in past 30 days 0.777 (0.416) 0.809 (0.393) 0.744 (0.436) 0.769 (0.422) 0.007 (0.012) 
     Body mass index 26.433 (5.889) 27.331 (6.072) 26.215 (6.131) 27.235 (6.198) -0.122 (0.166) 
     Obese 0.223 (0.416) 0.265 (0.441) 0.200 (0.400) 0.252 (0.434) -0.010 (0.011) 
     Any exercise in past 30 days 0.808 (0.394) 0.792 (0.406) 0.829 (0.377) 0.802 (0.398) 0.009 (0.012) 
     Pregnancy 0.050 (0.218) 0.042 (0.200) 0.044 (0.205) 0.037 (0.188) -0.001 (0.009) 
Self-assessed health      
     Overall health very good/excellent 0.611 (0.488) 0.610 (0.488) 0.607 (0.488) 0.587 (0.492) 0.018 (0.012) 
     Overall health excellent 0.252 (0.434) 0.255 (0.436) 0.254 (0.435) 0.233 (0.422) 0.025 (0.010)** 
     Days not in good mental health 4.135 (7.741) 3.872 (7.742) 4.486 (8.117) 4.185 (8.082) 0.038 (0.201) 
     Days not in good physical health 2.309 (5.583) 2.362 (5.904) 2.534 (6.133) 2.520 (6.229) 0.067 (0.161) 
     Days with health-related limitation 1.658 (4.906) 1.693 (5.243) 1.736 (5.131) 1.730 (5.309) 0.040 (0.138) 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the age-by-time level, are in parentheses. BRFSS sampling weights are used. Means are 
reported, with standard deviations in parentheses. *** indicates the difference-in-difference is significant at the 1% level; ** 5%; * 10%.
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Table 4 – Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Effects of ACA Dependent Coverage Mandate on Health-Related Outcomes 
Outcome Variable                Baseline Model Demographic Controls Only Start in 2005 Start in 2001 Drop 3/10-12/10 
Health care access      
     Any health insurance 0.062 (0.010)*** [0.132] 0.065 (0.011)*** 0.058 (0.008)*** 0.056 (0.008)*** 0.067 (0.011)*** 
     Any primary doctor 0.036 (0.010)*** [0.064] 0.037 (0.010)*** 0.018 (0.009)** 0.022 (0.008)*** 0.039 (0.011)*** 
     Cost prevented care -0.025 (0.011)** [-0.058] -0.023 (0.011)** -0.022 (0.010)** -0.025 (0.010)*** -0.028 (0.012)** 
Preventive care utilization      
     Flu vaccination -0.026 (0.011)** [-0.062] -0.025 (0.011)** -0.027 (0.009)*** -0.027 (0.009)*** -0.021 (0.013)* 
     Well-patient checkup 0.008 (0.014) [0.016] 0.008 (0.014) 0.006 (0.012) 0.006 (0.012) 0.014 (0.016) 
     Pap test -0.004 (0.018) [-0.009] -0.003 (0.019) -0.012 (0.017) -0.025 (0.015)* -0.015 (0.020) 
Risky health behaviors      
     Currently smokes 0.010 (0.009) [0.023] 0.004 (0.009) -0.004 (0.008) -0.010 (0.007) 0.007 (0.010) 
     Drinks per month 1.674 (1.045) [0.037] 1.146 (1.084) 0.960 (0.849) 0.614 (0.781) 1.799 (1.163) 
     Risky drinker 0.008 (0.010) [0.019] 0.007 (0.010) 0.010 (0.008) 0.007 (0.008) 0.011 (0.011) 
     Body mass index -0.075 (0.142) [-0.013] -0.130 (0.139) -0.139 (0.122) -0.160 (0.112) -0.180 (0.152) 
     Obese -0.006 (0.010) [-0.014] -0.010 (0.010) -0.009 (0.008) -0.008 (0.008) -0.012 (0.011) 
     Any exercise 0.002 (0.009) [0.005] 0.006 (0.009) 0.007 (0.007) 0.009 (0.007) -0.001 (0.009) 
     Pregnancy -0.003 (0.008) [-0.014] -0.002 (0.008) -0.0002 (0.006) 0.0003 (0.006) -0.004 (0.009) 
Self-assessed health      
     Very good/exc. Health 0.012 (0.010) [0.025] 0.013 (0.011) 0.014 (0.009)* 0.015 (0.008)* 0.007 (0.011) 
     Excellent health 0.022 (0.010)** [0.051] 0.021 (0.009)** 0.022 (0.008)*** 0.021 (0.007)*** 0.024 (0.010)** 
     Days not good mental 0.084 (0.181) [0.011] 0.077 (0.180) 0.112 (0.156) 0.091 (0.148) 0.193 (0.194) 
     Days not good phys. 0.120 (0.145) [0.021] 0.119 (0.144) 0.029 (0.125) 0.051 (0.119) 0.150 (0.149) 
     Days health limitations 0.105 (0.131) [0.021] 0.101 (0.129) 0.102 (0.115) 0.081 (0.110) 0.214 (0.141) 
Notes: *** indicates significant at the 1% level; ** 5%; * 10%. Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the age-by-time level, are in 
parentheses. All regressions include the controls plus state and time fixed effects. BRFSS sampling weights are used. For the baseline regression, effect sizes in 
standard deviations of the dependent variable (for the treatment group in the pre-treatment period) are in brackets.  
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Table 5 – Placebo Regressions 
Outcome Variable 
2005-2009 
Treatment 10/07 
2004-2008 
Treatment 10/06 
2003-2007 
Treatment 10/05 
2002-2006 
Treatment 10/04 
2001-2005 
Treatment 10/03 
Treated: 27-29 
Control: 31-33 
Health care access 
     Insurance -0.008 (0.012) -0.003 (0.011) 0.015 (0.010) -0.006 (0.010) -0.016 (0.009)* 0.010 (0.008) 
     Doctor -0.030 (0.012)** -0.007 (0.012) 0.010 (0.011) 0.034 (0.010)*** 0.003 (0.010) -0.003 (0.009) 
     Cost prevent 0.005 (0.011) -0.002 (0.012) -0.019 (0.011)* -0.010 (0.011) 0.003 (0.013) 0.004 (0.009) 
Preventive care utilization      
     Flu vaccin. -0.010 (0.015) -0.003 (0.012) -0.016 (0.011) -0.002 (0.010) -0.009 (0.009) 0.021 (0.009)** 
     Checkup 0.004 (0.016) -0.004 (0.016) -0.001 (0.018) -- -- 0.006 (0.012) 
     Pap test 0.031 (0.037) -0.012 (0.020) -0.012 (0.035) -0.027 (0.018) -0.030 (0.026) -0.018 (0.017) 
Risky health behaviors      
     Smoker -0.031 (0.010)*** -0.003 (0.010) 0.002 (0.010) -0.011 (0.010) -0.016 (0.009)* -0.025 (0.008)*** 
     Drinks/month -0.903 (1.226) -1.358 (1.139) -0.620 (1.000) -1.276 (0.988) -0.519 (0.883) -0.990 (0.802) 
     Risky drinker 0.002 (0.011) 0.001 (0.010) -0.017 (0.010) -0.009 (0.013) -- -0.003 (0.008) 
     BMI 0.009 (0.146) 0.085 (0.137) -0.098 (0.135) -0.075 (0.127) -0.051 (0.113) 0.131 (0.127) 
     Obese 0.002 (0.011) 0.009 (0.010) -0.004 (0.010) 0.001 (0.009) -0.001 (0.008) 0.003 (0.009) 
     Any exercise 0.009 (0.010) 0.008 (0.009) 0.006 (0.009) -0.002 (0.010) -0.012 (0.009) -0.009 (0.007) 
     Pregnancy 0.003 (0.009) 0.004 (0.009) 0.008 (0.010) 0.003 (0.009) 0.002 (0.009) 0.003 (0.007) 
Self-assessed health      
     V. good/exc. 0.004 (0.012) -0.003 (0.011) 0.008 (0.011) 0.006 (0.010) -0.012 (0.010) 0.012 (0.009) 
     Excellent 0.002 (0.011) 0.001 (0.010) 0.011 (0.009) 0.002 (0.009) 0.008 (0.009) -0.013 (0.008) 
     Days mental -0.001 (0.189) 0.040 (0.181) -0.126 (0.172) 0.059 (0.170) 0.127 (0.165) -0.060 (0.151) 
     Days phys. -0.161 (0.131) -0.044 (0.126) 0.027 (0.123) 0.356 (0.129)*** 0.125 (0.129) -0.084 (0.131) 
     Days limit. -0.070 (0.117) -0.067 (0.110) 0.004 (0.105) 0.089 (0.104) 0.048 (0.101) -0.239 (0.110)** 
Notes: *** indicates significant at the 1% level; ** 5%; * 10%. Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the age-by-time level, are in 
parentheses. All regressions include the controls plus state and time fixed effects. BRFSS sampling weights are used. 
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Table 6 – Additional Robustness Checks for Outcomes with Multiple Placebo Test Failures 
Outcome Variable 
Estimates from Table 4 Column 1 
Treatment Group: Ages 23-25 
Control Group: Ages 27-29 
New Estimates 
Treatment Group: Ages 24-25 
Control Group: Ages 27-28 
New Estimates 
Treatment Group: Age 25 
Control Group: Age 27 
Any primary care doctor 0.036 (0.010)*** 0.028 (0.011)** 0.033 (0.013)*** 
Currently smokes cigarettes 0.010 (0.009) 0.016 (0.011) 0.002 (0.012) 
See notes for Table 5. 
 
Table 7 – Summary of Placebo Test Results with Different Age Ranges 
Treatment Group Control Group % Significant at 
1% Level 
% Significant at 
5% Level or 
Better 
% Significant at 
10% Level or 
Better 
Number of 
Outcomes with 
No Significant 
Results 
Number of 
Outcomes with 0 
or 1 Significant 
Results 
Ages 23-25 Ages 27-29 3.8% 6.7% 9.5% 11 16 
Ages 22-25 Ages 27-30 2.9% 8.6% 11.4% 11 14 
Ages 21-25 Ages 27-31 3.8% 11.4% 20.0% 7 14 
Ages 20-25 Ages 27-32 4.8% 14.3% 23.8% 7 12 
Ages 19-25 Ages 27-33 4.8% 15.2% 24.8% 6 12 
Ages 19-25 Ages 18, 27-29 1.9% 4.8% 13.3% 7 15 
See notes for Table 5. Bold denotes the baseline model from Table 4. 
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Table 8 – Heterogeneity by Prior State Dependent Coverage Mandate and Sex  
 Prior State Mandate Sex 
Outcome Variable No Prior Mandate Prior Mandate Female Male 
Health care access     
     Any health insurance coverage 0.089 (0.018)*** 0.051 (0.012)*** 0.048 (0.012)*** 0.073 (0.015)*** 
     Any primary care doctor 0.022 (0.018) 0.041 (0.013)*** 0.012 (0.013) 0.058 (0.017)*** 
     Cost prevented care in past year -0.016 (0.019) -0.031 (0.014)** -0.016 (0.014) -0.030 (0.016)* 
Preventive care utilization     
     Flu vaccination in past year -0.020 (0.017) -0.028 (0.013)** -0.043 (0.015)*** -0.015 (0.017) 
     Well-patient checkup in past year 0.034 (0.024) -0.002 (0.016) 0.004 (0.016) 0.009 (0.021) 
     Pap test in past year 0.008 (0.032) -0.008 (0.022) -0.004 (0.018) -- 
Risky health behaviors     
     Currently smokes cigarettes 0.013 (0.015) 0.011 (0.012) 0.017 (0.010)* 0.006 (0.014) 
     Alcoholic drinks in past 30 days 1.891 (1.618) 1.801 (1.276) 0.560 (0.590) 2.710 (1.876) 
     Risky drinker 0.012 (0.016) 0.004 (0.012) 0.006 (0.011) 0.013 (0.016) 
     Body mass index -0.324 (0.255) 0.036 (0.160) -0.129 (0.197) 0.031 (0.182) 
     Obese -0.015 (0.017) -0.002 (0.011) -0.013 (0.012) 0.002 (0.015) 
     Any exercise in past 30 days 0.015 (0.016) -0.004 (0.011) -0.009 (0.012) 0.016 (0.013) 
     Pregnancy 0.007 (0.013) -0.006 (0.010) -0.003 (0.008) -- 
Self-assessed health     
     Overall health very good or excellent 0.023 (0.019) 0.005 (0.013) -0.002 (0.014) 0.027 (0.016)* 
     Overall health excellent 0.034 (0.018)* 0.018 (0.012) 0.002 (0.012) 0.044 (0.015)*** 
     Days of last 30 not in good mental health 0.333 (0.315) -0.036 (0.213) 0.063 (0.234) 0.105 (0.260) 
     Days of last 30 not in good physical health -0.172 (0.284) 0.245 (0.155) 0.148 (0.188) 0.068 (0.208) 
     Days of last 30 with health-related limitations 0.016 (0.251) 0.124 (0.138) 0.294 (0.173)* -0.089 (0.188) 
See notes for Table 5. 
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Table 9 – Heterogeneity by Race and Education 
 Race Education 
Outcome Variable                White Non-White Not College Graduate College Graduate 
Health care access     
     Any health insurance coverage 0.063 (0.011)*** 0.060 (0.018)*** 0.074 (0.013)*** 0.052 (0.013)*** 
     Any primary care doctor 0.026 (0.012)** 0.048 (0.019)** 0.023 (0.013)* 0.073 (0.018)*** 
     Cost prevented care in past year -0.042 (0.011)*** -0.003 (0.020) -0.022 (0.014) -0.035 (0.013)*** 
Preventive care utilization     
     Flu vaccination in past year -0.018 (0.013) -0.038 (0.019)** -0.027 (0.014)** -0.023 (0.018) 
     Well-patient checkup in past year 0.007 (0.015) 0.014 (0.022) -0.002 (0.017) 0.043 (0.020)** 
     Pap test in past year -0.008 (0.021) -0.003 (0.031) -0.007 (0.023) 0.008 (0.027) 
Risky health behaviors     
     Currently smokes cigarettes 0.012 (0.012) 0.008 (0.015) 0.011 (0.013) 0.004 (0.011) 
     Alcoholic drinks in past 30 days 2.062 (1.117)* 1.083 (1.779) 1.978 (1.444) 0.971 (1.028) 
     Risky drinker in past 30 days 0.009 (0.012) 0.010 (0.016) 0.010 (0.012) -0.001 (0.015) 
     Body mass index 0.004 (0.175) -0.159 (0.247) 0.071 (0.180) -0.309 (0.190) 
     Obese -0.007 (0.011) -0.004 (0.018) 0.007 (0.013) -0.028 (0.014)** 
     Any exercise in past 30 days -0.009 (0.009) 0.017 (0.016) -0.003 (0.011) 0.014 (0.013) 
     Pregnancy -0.009 (0.008) 0.007 (0.013) -0.005 (0.011) -0.001 (0.008) 
Self-assessed health     
     Overall health very good or excellent 0.013 (0.011) 0.009 (0.020) -0.002 (0.013) 0.037 (0.016)** 
     Overall health excellent 0.032 (0.011)*** 0.007 (0.017) 0.007 (0.011) 0.053 (0.017)*** 
     Days of last 30 not in good mental health 0.080 (0.214) 0.061 (0.313) 0.190 (0.240) -0.179 (0.206) 
     Days of last 30 not in good physical health -0.048 (0.167) 0.353 (0.215) 0.300 (0.192) -0.245 (0.165) 
     Days of last 30 with health-related limitations 0.254 (0.133)* -0.107 (0.231) 0.257 (0.171) -0.169 (0.144) 
See notes for Table 5. 
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Table 10 – Effects on Younger Young Adults 
Outcome Variable                
Estimates from Table 4 Column 1 
Treatment Group: Ages 23-25 
Control Group: Ages 27-29 
Estimates for Younger Young Adults 
Treatment Group: Ages 19-22 
Control Group: Ages 18 and 27 
Health care access   
     Any health insurance coverage 0.062 (0.010)*** 0.045 (0.012)*** 
     Any primary care doctor 0.036 (0.010)*** 0.002 (0.013) 
     Cost prevented care in past year -0.025 (0.011)** -0.025 (0.011)** 
Preventive care utilization   
     Flu vaccination in past year -0.026 (0.011)** -0.033 (0.014)** 
     Well-patient checkup in past year 0.008 (0.014) -0.032 (0.016)** 
     Pap test in past year -0.004 (0.018) -0.026 (0.021) 
Risky health behaviors   
     Currently smokes cigarettes 0.010 (0.009) -0.008 (0.011) 
     Alcoholic drinks in past 30 days 1.674 (1.045) 1.320 (1.070) 
     Risky drinker in past 30 days 0.008 (0.010) 0.001 (0.010) 
     Body mass index -0.075 (0.142) -0.284 (0.145)* 
     Obese -0.006 (0.010) -0.005 (0.011) 
     Any exercise in past 30 days 0.002 (0.009) 0.007 (0.010) 
     Pregnancy -0.003 (0.008) -0.016 (0.008)** 
Self-assessed health   
     Overall health very good or excellent 0.012 (0.010) -0.006 (0.013) 
     Overall health excellent 0.022 (0.010)** 0.002 (0.012) 
     Days of last 30 not in good mental health 0.084 (0.181) 0.148 (0.209) 
     Days of last 30 not in good physical health 0.120 (0.145) 0.113 (0.134) 
     Days of last 30 with health-related limitations 0.105 (0.131) 0.135 (0.126) 
See notes for Table 5. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 – Full Regression Output for Selected Dependent Variables 
Control Variable Insurance Smoker Excellent Health 
Treated*Post 0.062 (0.010)*** 0.010 (0.009) 0.022 (0.010)** 
Age=24 -0.006 (0.010) -0.002 (0.009) 0.007 (0.009) 
Age=25 -0.013 (0.010) 0.019 (0.008)** 0.006 (0.009) 
Age=27 0.006 (0.011) 0.033 (0.010)*** -0.012 (0.010) 
Age=28 0.015 (0.011) 0.050 (0.010)*** -0.018 (0.011) 
Age=29 0.026 (0.012)** 0.040 (0.009)*** -0.010 (0.010) 
Female 0.063 (0.005)*** -0.055 (0.005)*** -0.023 (0.006)*** 
Non-Hispanic black -0.015 (0.010) -0.128 (0.009)*** 0.008 (0.010) 
Hispanic -0.123 (0.009)*** -0.186 (0.008)*** -0.008 (0.008) 
Other than black, Hispanic, or white -0.010 (0.011) -0.027 (0.010)** -0.004 (0.012) 
Currently married 0.069 (0.006)*** -0.110 (0.006)*** 0.021 (0.006)*** 
High school degree but no further 0.105 (0.012)*** -0.086 (0.011)*** 0.038 (0.010)*** 
Some college but no 4-year degree 0.166 (0.012)*** -0.160 (0.011)*** 0.052 (0.010)*** 
College graduate 0.247 (0.013)*** -0.311 (0.012)*** 0.113 (0.010)*** 
Between $10,000 and $15,000 -0.047 (0.017)*** -0.004 (0.015) -0.005 (0.014) 
Between $15,000 and $20,000 -0.080 (0.014)*** 0.022 (0.014) 0.003 (0.012) 
Between $20,000 and $25,000 -0.039 (0.013)*** 0.0005 (0.013) 0.004 (0.011) 
Between $25,000 and $35,000 0.040 (0.014)*** -0.017 (0.014) 0.032 (0.012)*** 
Between $35,000 and $50,000 0.109 (0.013)*** -0.035 (0.013)*** 0.045 (0.011)*** 
Between $50,000 and $75,000 0.160 (0.013)*** -0.066 (0.013)*** 0.059 (0.011)*** 
$75,000 and over 0.172 (0.014)*** -0.055 (0.013)*** 0.117 (0.013)*** 
One child in household 0.030 (0.007)*** 0.038 (0.007)*** -0.012 (0.007) 
Two children in household 0.041 (0.008)*** 0.045 (0.008)*** -0.004 (0.008) 
Three children in household 0.029 (0.012)** 0.061 (0.012)*** -0.017 (0.010)* 
Four children in household 0.016 (0.018) 0.065 (0.019)*** -0.047 (0.014)*** 
Five or more children in household 0.048 (0.028)* 0.051 (0.025)** -0.028 (0.023) 
Cell phone only -0.007 (0.008) 0.008 (0.008) 0.007 (0.008) 
Student -0.007 (0.010) -0.026 (0.009)*** 0.014 (0.010) 
Unemployed -0.171 (0.010)*** 0.105 (0.010)*** -0.034 (0.008)*** 
State unemployment rate 0.003 (0.005) -0.008 (0.004)** 0.001 (0.004) 
Pre-ACA state mandate 0.015 (0.010) 0.002 (0.009) -0.022 (0.009)** 
Notes: *** indicates significant at the 1% level; ** 5%; * 10%. Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and 
clustered at the age-by-time level, are in parentheses. All regressions also include the state and time fixed effects. 
BRFSS sampling weights are used. Separate variables for “treated” and “post” are not included because they are 
subsumed by the age and time fixed effects.  
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Table A2 – Additional Robustness Checks for Prior Mandate/Sex Subsample Outcomes with Multiple Placebo Test Failures 
Outcome Variable 
Estimates from Table 8 
Treatment Group: Ages 23-25 
Control Group: Ages 27-29 
New Estimates 
Treatment Group: Ages 24-25 
Control Group: Ages 27-28 
New Estimates 
Treatment Group: Age 25 
Control Group: Age 27 
No prior law    
     Any primary care doctor 0.022 (0.018) 0.028 (0.022) 0.017 (0.025) 
     Days with health-related limitations 0.016 (0.251) 0.034 (0.288) 0.214 (0.273) 
Prior    
     Any primary care doctor 0.041 (0.013)*** 0.029 (0.014)** 0.041 (0.016)** 
     Currently smokes cigarettes 0.011 (0.012) 0.012 (0.014) -0.007 (0.017) 
     Alcoholic drinks in past 30 days 1.801 (1.276) 0.553 (1.626) -0.832 (2.086) 
     Days not in good physical health 0.245 (0.155) 0.276 (0.181) 0.183 (0.199) 
Female    
     Flu vaccination in past year -0.043 (0.015)*** -0.037 (0.018)** -0.071 (0.016)*** 
     Currently smokes cigarettes 0.017 (0.010)* 0.014 (0.011) 0.029 (0.013)** 
     Alcoholic drinks in past 30 days 0.560 (0.590) 0.518 (0.688) 1.397 (0.808)* 
     Days not in good physical health 0.148 (0.188) 0.298 (0.219) 0.508 (0.210)** 
     Days with health-related limitations 0.294 (0.173)* 0.317 (0.206) 0.608 (0.201)*** 
Male    
     Any primary care doctor 0.058 (0.017)*** 0.049 (0.018)*** 0.063 (0.017)*** 
     Currently smokes cigarettes 0.006 (0.014) 0.020 (0.017) -0.019 (0.019) 
See notes for Table 5. 
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Table A3 – Additional Robustness Checks for Race/Education Subsample Outcomes with Multiple Placebo Test Failures 
Outcome Variable 
Estimates from Table 9 
Treatment Group: Ages 23-25 
Control Group: Ages 27-29 
New Estimates 
Treatment Group: Ages 24-25 
Control Group: Ages 27-28 
New Estimates 
Treatment Group: Age 25 
Control Group: Age 27 
White    
     Any health insurance coverage 0.063 (0.011)*** 0.042 (0.013)*** 0.046 (0.015)*** 
     Flu vaccination in past year -0.018 (0.013) -0.032 (0.013)** -0.051 (0.014)*** 
     Currently smokes cigarettes 0.012 (0.012) 0.009 (0.013) -0.013 (0.014) 
     Overall health very good/excellent 0.013 (0.011) 0.001 (0.013) -0.008 (0.016) 
     Days with health-related limitations 0.254 (0.133)* 0.379 (0.148)** 0.448 (0.151)*** 
Non-white    
     Any primary care doctor 0.048 (0.019)** 0.028 (0.021) 0.008 (0.022) 
     Cost prevented care in past year -0.003 (0.020) 0.023 (0.022) 0.053 (0.025)** 
     Days not in good physical health 0.353 (0.215) 0.243 (0.233) 0.042 (0.268) 
Not college graduate    
     Currently smokes cigarettes 0.011 (0.013) 0.020 (0.015) 0.003 (0.017) 
     Overall health excellent 0.007 (0.011) 0.005 (0.013) -0.012 (0.014)** 
College graduate    
     Any primary care doctor 0.073 (0.018)*** 0.079 (0.021)*** 0.074 (0.024)*** 
     Flu vaccination in past year -0.023 (0.018) -0.023 (0.020) -0.030 (0.018)* 
     Currently smokes cigarettes 0.004 (0.011)  0.002 (0.013) -0.001 (0.015) 
     Overall health very good/excellent 0.037 (0.016)** 0.031 (0.018)* 0.020 (0.022) 
     Overall health excellent 0.053 (0.017)*** 0.037 (0.020)* 0.049 (0.021)** 
     Days not in good mental health -0.179 (0.206) 0.052 (0.243) 0.171 (0.306) 
See notes for Table 5. 
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Table A4 – Additional Robustness Checks for Younger Young Adults Outcomes with Multiple Placebo Test Failures 
Outcome Variable                
Estimates from Table 10 Column 2 
Treatment Group: Ages 19-22 
Control Group: Ages 18 and 27 
New Estimates 
Treatment Group: Ages 19-20 
Control Group: Age 18 
New Estimates 
Treatment Group: Age 19 
Control Group: Age 18 
Any health insurance coverage 0.045 (0.012)*** 0.037 (0.014)** 0.044 (0.015)*** 
Pap test in past year -0.026 (0.021) 0.008 (0.028) 0.017 (0.028) 
Body mass index -0.284 (0.145)* -0.282 (0.203) -0.096 (0.205) 
Obese -0.005 (0.011) -0.001 (0.014) 0.009 (0.014) 
See notes for Table 5. 
 
